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1. Introduction 
Rapid cost reductions mean that solar and wind are likely to play an increasingly important 
role in the world’s future energy system. For example, modelling suggests that it would be 
feasible for solar photovoltaics and wind to contribute around 90 percent of annual electricity 
demand in the Australian National Electricity Market (Blakers et al., 2017), with 
hydroelectricity and biomass providing the remainder.  
A key advantage of solar and wind energy is that they avoid carbon dioxide emissions. This 
provides an opportunity for energy system transformation to make a major contribution to the 
climate change mitigation goal of keeping anthropogenic global warming below two degrees 
Celsius (DDPP, 2015; OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017). An increase in renewable energy share 
can also help to reduce local pollution, diversify energy mixes, and ameliorate energy 
security risks arising from reliance on fossil fuels sourced from geopolitically unstable 
countries.   
Increasing reliance on solar and wind energy also comes with challenges, although these are 
surmountable. One is that solar and wind face intermittency issues without adequate storage 
solutions or the use of other dispatchable energy sources. Frequency disturbances, when there 
is insufficient inertia in electricity systems, can also be important to manage. Solar and wind 
energy sources have been more costly than established energy sources until recently (IEA, 
2015; IEA, 2016). This has motivated policy intervention, which has then provided a 
favourable environment for cost reductions through learning-by-doing. 
There is considerable variation in renewable energy adoption across countries. For instance, 
Denmark has high levels of wind energy use, but combined solar and wind energy use per 
capita was between 10 and 40 times lower in five other European Union (EU) countries in 
2015. Germany had solar energy use per capita that was between 20 and 120 times greater 
than five other EU countries in 2015, including some with more abundant sunshine. 
This paper examines the factors that have been important for the early adoption of solar and 
wind energy. We consider many variables that could potentially be relevant, including 
policies, preferences, and access to domestic finance. We use cross-sectional and panel 
regression approaches for renewable energy adoption up to 2015 for two groups of countries: 
a group of EU countries, and a larger international sample. The advantages of solar and wind 
energy provide strong motivation for our study. The paper furthers understanding of the 
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factors that promote solar and wind energy and whether frequently-recommended policies 
have been associated with successful outcomes. 
The paper makes a number of contributions relative to the existing literature. We separately 
consider solar photovoltaic (PV), solar thermal, and wind energy adoption, identifying the 
factors that have been important for the adoption of each energy type. We give focus to the 
role of carbon pricing, an efficient policy approach that has not received as much attention in 
the empirical literature as other policies such as feed-in tariffs or renewable energy 
certificates. Another key feature of our approach is our use of a cardinal, holistic policy 
support variable from an Ecofys (2014) report on subsidies and costs of energy for the 
European Commission. We refer to this variable as aggregate policy support. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature. Section 3 explains 
our method and data. The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 provides some brief 
case studies. The final section concludes.     
2. Literature review 
2.1 Current methodologies in the literature explaining solar and wind energy use 
There are many previous studies using various panel regression approaches to assess the 
determinants of renewable energy use. Zhao et al. (2013) used the Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood estimation technique for a global panel, finding that renewable electricity policies 
are important in promoting renewable electricity use. Carley (2009) found that renewable 
portfolio standard implementation is not a significant predictor of the renewable electricity 
share of total generation of US states from 1998–2006, based on fixed effects vector 
decomposition estimates. Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) used a two-stage approach to separately 
consider the adoption of and quantity of renewable energy used by a panel of developing 
countries. Basher et al. (2015) note that the renewable energy share of electricity generation 
is not stationary in many OECD countries, which poses a challenge for empirical studies that 
focus on time-series variation. 
Survey-based techniques have also been used to assess renewable energy deployment. For 
example, Friebe et al. (2014) used a qualitative approach to identify key factors for project 
investment decisions on wind farms and then use a quantitative survey approach (“maximum 
difference scaling”) to further evaluate the importance of these key factors. Eleftheriadis and 
Anagnostopoulou (2015) surveyed renewable energy experts to identify barriers to renewable 
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energy diffusion. Murakami et al. (2015) used a choice experiment to quantify the 
willingness to pay for renewable electricity by US and Japanese consumers. 
Simulation models and scenario analysis are other alternatives. Hirth and Steckel (2016), for 
example, use a techno-economic power system model to show the combined effect of the 
weighted average cost of capital and carbon prices on the renewable energy share. 
2.2 Factors that may affect early adoption of solar and wind energy 
Policymakers could theoretically use one policy instrument to target the adoption of 
renewable energy. In practice, multi-dimensional policy approaches are often employed. Jaffe 
et al. (2005) note that the interaction of combined market failures associated with pollution 
externalities and diffusion of new technologies provides a rationale for a portfolio of public 
policies that aids adoption of environmentally beneficial technology. Sener and Fthenakis 
(2014) discuss the need for a holistic approach to policy for large-scale solar PV in the United 
States. We use an aggregate policy support variable from a report by Ecofys (2014) for the 
European Commission, as described in section 3, to account for aggregate policy support in 
multi-dimensional policy frameworks. We expect that the aggregate policy support variable 
has had a positive impact on renewable energy use. 
Our use of an aggregate policy variable complements prior studies that focus on specific 
policies. Using an instrumental variables approach, Smith and Urpelainen (2014) find that 
feed-in tariffs have been effective in increasing renewable electricity take-up. Baldwin et al. 
(2016) find that renewable electricity policy impacts differ by country income group. Polzin 
et al. (2015) note that feed-in tariffs are more effective for less mature technologies, whereas 
renewable portfolio standards appear more effective for mature technologies. Policies are not 
always successful; Aguirre and Ibikunle (2014) conclude that policies involving voluntary 
participation appear to have a negative relationship with renewable energy investment, 
possibly as a result of uncertainty over government policy changes. Studies also find mixed 
results depending on the type of policy support. Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) show negative 
impacts of institutional and strategic policy support measures from the IEA/IRENA Global 
Renewable Energy Policies and Measures Database, but positive impacts from economic and 
regulatory instruments. 
Carbon pricing is another specific policy that could influence renewable energy adoption. 
Carbon pricing can promote cost-effective emissions abatement by providing incentives for 
private agents to exploit low-cost abatement opportunities (Aldy and Stavins, 2012). A 
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carbon price gives producers and consumers an incentive to consider the external costs that 
their emissions impose on others, promoting socially-efficient resource allocation by 
addressing the market failure resulting from these externalities. The idea of charging agents 
for the external costs that they impose on others dates back to Arthur Pigou in the early 20th 
century (Mankiw, 2009). More recently, there has been a growing number of carbon pricing 
initiatives around the world, and plans for more (Hepburn, 2017). Yet there is a lack of 
empirical studies assessing the impact of carbon pricing on renewable energy adoption. For 
instance, the paper by Basher et al. (2015) includes a table (Table 1) that summarizes 
empirical studies on the impact of policy on renewable energy diffusion. The table mentions 
feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards, but not carbon pricing. We expect a positive 
impact of carbon pricing on renewable energy use, as carbon pricing provides an advantage 
to renewables by making fossil-fuel alternatives more costly.   
Various aspects of governance could be relevant for the adoption of renewable energy. Best 
and Burke (2017) find that general government effectiveness has been important for 
electrification in low- and middle-income countries in recent decades, and similar may be 
true for adoption of modern energy sources. Governments that are more involved in global 
political processes may also be more likely to promote renewable energy to contribute to 
international climate goals. 
Policy measures focusing on innovation could also affect renewable energy adoption. 
Countries with a greater focus on innovation could be faster to adopt new technology such as 
solar energy. Johnstone et al. (2010) show that various policies can spur innovation: feed-in 
tariffs appear to increase patent numbers for solar, while renewable energy certificates appear 
to be important for increasing wind energy patent numbers. Popp et al. (2011) analyze the 
impact of patents on investment in renewable energy capacity and find that technological 
advances do increase investment to some extent. Together, these two studies indicate that 
policy can foster innovation, which can increase renewable energy investment. Veugelers 
(2012) surveys the empirical literature, citing success in environmental policies inducing 
clean technology innovation, while also noting that there are fewer studies on the adoption of 
clean technologies.  
It may well be the case that there is greater adoption of solar and wind energy when citizens 
have had stronger preferences for these energy types and when they are more concerned 
about climate change. This can occur via increased demand for use of these technologies. 
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Another mechanism is that stronger preference for renewables may make it less likely that 
policy support for renewables would be wound back in the future, reducing uncertainty. The 
negative impact of policy uncertainty on renewable energy investment has been noted for the 
United States (Barradale, 2010). 
We also investigate if the size of financial sectors is important for solar and wind energy 
adoption. Countries with greater access to financial capital may adopt more capital-intensive 
energy types such as solar and wind (Brunnschweiler, 2010; Best, 2017; Lin and Omoju, 
2017). Larger quantities of financial capital would lower the cost of capital, all else equal, 
benefitting solar and wind energy generation, which is capital intensive and sensitive to the 
cost of capital.  
Financial sector composition could also be important. The banking sector has been a key 
source of finance for energy investment in the past (IEA, 2014), but faces financial 
regulations that discourage long-term energy finance (Kaminker and Stewart, 2012; Ng and 
Tao, 2016). Private investors, including pension funds, will increasingly be the source of 
capital for renewable energy due to high government debt in many countries (Della Croce et 
al., 2011; Kaminker and Stewart, 2012). Corsatea et al. (2014) find that corporate debt is a 
major factor supporting sales of wind turbines. Equity is typically a smaller component of 
financial capital than debt for solar and wind projects, with average debt to equity ratios of 
approximately 70:30 being common (Ecofys, 2017). Further, Best (2017) does not find a 
significant association between equity and national-level use of solar or wind energy.  
Trade could also be important for the dissemination of technology. Omri and Nguyen (2014) 
find that trade openness is a driver of renewable energy consumption, and Lin and Omoju 
(2017) find that trade openness has a positive and significant impact on the share of modern 
renewables. Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) find a negative relationship between trade intensity 
and the probability of adopting modern renewables in developing countries. 
Natural endowments may also influence the decision to adopt solar and wind technologies. 
For instance, it seems likely that being blessed with rich wind resources might lead to more 
uptake of wind energy use, and perhaps less uptake of solar energy technologies, as solar and 
wind are substitutes. Burke (2010; 2012; 2013) considers reserves of fossil fuels and the 
availability of hydro endowments for national uptake of renewables, but did not examine the 
importance of solar and wind energy resources. The study by Ondraczek et al. (2015), on the 
other hand, used global horizontal irradiation in explaining solar PV cost.  
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Other variables like income and historical national carbon dioxide emission levels could also 
be important contributors to adoption of solar and wind technologies. Burke (2010) finds that 
electricity use from different primary energy types follows a national-level ladder with 
countries progressing to use of different types of energy as per-capita income increases. Solar 
and wind are on upper rungs of the energy ladder, meaning that their adoption has to date 
been predominantly by higher income countries. Sadorsky (2009) finds that higher levels of 
carbon dioxide emissions per capita drive greater subsequent renewable energy consumption 
in G7 countries, possibly due to increased concern for climate change when emissions are 
higher. 
2.3 Gaps in the literature 
Previous studies tend to focus on aggregated renewable energy variables. Some split 
renewable energy into two categories: hydro and non-hydro, while others consider solar and 
wind separately. Our study is more specific: we separately consider solar PV, solar thermal, 
and wind energy. It is important to consider energy types separately due to the differences in 
technology attributes and stage of technology maturity. 
Previous regression analysis has commonly focussed on particular polices such as feed-in 
tariffs and renewable portfolio standards, but often does not consider the overall strength of 
policy settings. Also, empirical research often does not consider carbon pricing, an important 
policy that should be likely to affect renewable energy use. We attempt to capture policy 
effects more comprehensively with a variable for aggregate policy support, and also assess 
the important carbon pricing variable while controlling for other policies. In addition, we 
consider factors that make an underlying contribution to the general policy environment: the 
role of preferences and perceptions, plus general government effectiveness, a factor that can 
underpin policy formulation and stability. 
Prior studies typically focus on temporal variation, using fixed-effects panel regressions. We 
focus on variation across countries. This is because we are interested in identifying 
fundamental explanations for why some countries have been more successful in adopting 
solar and wind technologies than others. 
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3. Method and data 
3.1 Empirical model 
We focus on using cross-sectional variation to estimate the following model: 
                               𝑇𝑐
𝑗 =  𝑆𝑐𝛽
𝑗 +  𝑃𝑐𝛼
𝑗 +  𝒙𝑐𝜒
𝑗 +  𝜀𝑐
𝑗
  (1) 
𝑇𝑐
𝑗
 is energy use for country 𝑐 for energy type 𝑗. We assess solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, 
and wind, considering both primary energy and electricity generation. Considering electricity 
in addition to primary energy is important because the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
data tend to understate the role of solar and wind as primary energy sources due to the high 
inefficiency of some combustible energy generation (Sauar, 2017). This issue does not affect 
measures of the electricity generated (in megawatt hours) by each energy source. 
𝑆𝑐 is a variable of policy support. For the international sample, we use a binary variable with 
value of 1 for countries with a carbon price in 2010 at a national or sub-national level and 0 
otherwise. 35 countries had a carbon price in 2010, including 32 countries with a national-
level carbon price, and three countries (United States, Canada, and Japan) with a sub-national 
carbon price (Kossoy et al., 2015). Binary variables are useful given the difficulty in 
accurately measuring cardinal policy variables for a large sample of countries. Carbon prices, 
for example, are difficult to compare across countries due to differences in sectoral and 
geographical coverage, and as a result of the various other types of exemptions that are 
commonly applied (Kossoy et al. 2015). Prior authors have also noted that the intensity of 
renewable energy policy instruments is often challenging to measure (Zhao et al., 2013 for 
example). Daily changes in exchange rates and prices for emissions trading systems introduce 
further complications. The carbon pricing instrument variable in this paper includes both 
emissions trading systems and taxes. 
For the EU sample, 𝑆𝑐 is a comprehensive measure of aggregate policy support from an 
Ecofys (2014) report prepared for the European Commission. We use wind policy support in 
the wind regressions and solar policy support in the solar regressions. We use the intensity of 
energy policy support, in thousand euro (2012) per megawatt hour. The Ecofys (2014) report 
aims to provide consistent and complete data for all 28 EU countries, monetizing a broad 
range of policies including research and development, investment support such as investment 
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grants, and support to production such as feed-in-tariffs.1 For instance, the euro values for 
renewable energy quotas with tradable certificates are either taken from national reports, or 
calculated as the price of certificates multiplied by the quantity of certificates. The use of a 
comprehensive policy support variable, in euro values, helps to avoid the high 
multicollinearity that would exist if one were to use many separate variables for each 
individual policy, as countries typically use more than one policy tool to reduce emissions. 
𝑃𝑐 in equation (1) is for preferences or perceptions. For the EU sample, we use the percentage 
of respondents who think that their national government should focus on development of 
solar (or wind) energy, from a one-off European Commission (2006) survey. For our 
international sample, we use the percentage of respondents who see climate change as a 
serious personal threat from a Gallup (2009) survey covering 128 countries. The percentage 
of citizens in each country that view climate change as a personal threat is related to 
renewable energy preference, as renewable energy is a primary means to address climate 
change. 
𝒙𝑐 is a vector of other potential determinants including log GDP per capita, log global 
horizontal irradiance, log wind energy potential, log energy use per capita, government 
effectiveness, a political globalization variable, binary variables for specific policies of feed-
in tariffs and renewable energy credits,2 private credit from deposit money banks, insurance 
assets, and domestic private debt. The error term is 𝜀𝑐
𝑗
, with 𝐸(𝜀𝑐
𝑗) = 0. Our cross-sectional 
regressions use ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors that are robust to 
heteroscedasticity.  
3.2 Cross-sectional versus temporal variation 
Analysis of cross-sectional variation is appropriate for our study for a number of reasons. The 
primary reason is that we are interested in identifying the underlying factors affecting 
renewables uptake on a country-by-country basis, so as to understand why some countries 
have been more successful than others. This focus is naturally suited to a cross-country rather 
than time-series analysis. A second reason is that time-series variation in some of the 
variables is either not available (as is the case for the solar preference variable) or reflects 
                                                   
1 One of the production support measures that the Ecofys (2014) report monetizes is the free allocation of 
emissions allowances in the EU emissions trading system, but this is not included in the solar and wind policy 
support measures that we use. 
2 It is difficult to quantify these specific policies in a manner that is consistent across a broad range of countries. 
Binary variables for policies are often used in the literature (Brunnschweiler, 2010; Pfeiffer and Mulder, 2013, 
for example). 
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short-term variation that may not immediately affect our dependent variables given the lags 
involved in adopting renewable energy. Our cross-sectional estimates avoid the precise 
specification of time-series dynamics, allowing for a more parsimonious modelling approach.  
We also present panel estimations. We use the between estimator, which Stern (2010) notes 
can be seen as a cross-sectional regression on the time-series mean of the data for each 
country. The between estimator allows analysis using multiple years of data, while avoiding 
the issue of non-stationary time-series data. Like cross-sectional estimates, the between 
estimator is typically interpreted as providing long-run effects.  
3.3 Lagged explanatory variables 
Our main cross-sectional estimates use 5-year lags in most cases. The preference data are 
from more than five years prior to the energy use data due to the timing of the preference 
surveys: energy preferences for EU citizens are from 2005, and climate change perceptions 
for the international group of countries are from 2007–2008. These lags allow time for 
preferences and perceptions to be translated into policies and potential future outcomes. We 
also experiment with alternative lag lengths: the panel regression results in section 4 use a 3-
year lag for the explanatory variables. Additional results with alternative lag lengths are 
available on request.  
Use of lags allows for effects of the explanatory variables to be captured comprehensively: 
both short-term and medium-term effects will be included if the lag length is sufficiently 
long. This is important for some variables in particular that work with a delayed impact, such 
as the research and development component of the aggregate policy support variable. Also, 
policies and preferences for solar energy in the past may promote installation of solar energy 
infrastructure in the past, but once installed, it would generally produce solar electricity for a 
considerable period of time (longer than our lags). 
Using lagged variables for the cross-sectional regression could be a problem if the 
explanatory variables change considerably over time. For instance, preferences for energy 
types are likely to vary over time, although it does not seem to us that there have been large 
shocks to preferences for solar or wind energy in the way that there have been for nuclear 
power, for example. It is possible that the Fukushima nuclear disaster led to greater 
preference for solar and wind energy, although there are many other alternative energy types 
also. The fossil fuel share of energy in Japan, for example, increased from 81 percent to over 
94 percent following the Fukushima nuclear disaster. The lag length will not be a major issue 
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for variables that are highly persistent. There are strong positive correlations between 
different years of the aggregate policy support variables of up to 0.96. For an example related 
to perceptions, the correlation between Gallup (2009; 2011) polls in 2007/8 and 2010 on 
climate change perception was 0.9.3 Preferences for renewable energy types have also been 
found to be at a consistently high level in industrialized countries (Renewable Energies 
Agency, 2016).  
3.4 Challenges for estimation 
Reverse causation from energy use to policy support is one potential source of endogeneity. 
For instance, some production or consumption subsidies are proportional to renewable energy 
use. To reduce endogeneity concerns, we use policy variables in euros per unit of energy 
rather than in aggregate terms. Reverse causation to financial variables is unlikely to be a 
major issue, as components of financial sectors are large and mature in many countries 
relative to the size of investment flows into solar and wind energy capacity. 
Omitted variable bias is another potential source of endogeneity. While the EU policy support 
variable that we use is not measured perfectly, it is intended to be comprehensive. To further 
address the issue of potentially missing policy variables, we control for government 
effectiveness, a comprehensive variable measuring the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation in general. For parsimony we have not controlled for fossil fuel reserves. The 
correlations between fossil fuel reserves and modern renewable energy use are low in Table 
A.2.  
Finally, we note that it is challenging to precisely evaluate policy impacts using observed 
data (Athey and Imbens, 2017). This is because it is not possible to conduct a controlled 
experiment for policy impacts at the macroeconomic level. For instance, carbon prices are not 
exogenous treatments; they could be more likely in countries that also employ other policies 
favoring renewable energy, or in countries where renewable energy lobbyists are more 
successful. 
  
                                                   
3 There is evidence of some changes in climate change perceptions at sub-national levels. Konisky et al. (2016) 
find a temporary positive relationship between extreme weather activity and concern about climate change using 
data for storm events across the United States.   
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3.5 Data and sources 
We use energy variables from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2017), including 
energy use per capita and its five-year change, energy shares, and corresponding electricity 
levels and changes. Table 1 shows the average values for solar and wind energy shares and 
per capita levels. While the average shares are relatively low, some countries have much 
higher shares. Denmark had a wind share of total primary energy supply of 8 percent in 2015. 
Table 1. Average energy use by type, 2015. 
 Share (EU) Share (global) Primary energy 
use per capita 
(EU) 
Primary energy 
use per capita 
(global) 
Wind 0.015 0.005 0.045 0.012 
Solar PV 0.004 0.001 0.011 0.003 
Solar Thermal 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.003 
Notes: These mean values cover 28 countries for the EU sample and 139 countries for the global sample. Share 
is percentage of total primary energy supply divided by 100. Primary energy use per capita is in tonnes of oil 
equivalent. Source: IEA (2017). 
Data sources for the explanatory variables include the World Bank (2017) for gross domestic 
product, total energy use per capita, and population. Data for global horizontal irradiance are 
from Breyer and Gerlach (2010; 2013), while data on wind energy potential are from Lu et al. 
(2009). We use government effectiveness data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(2015), and political globalization data from the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006). 
We also use binary variables for countries with feed-in tariff and renewable energy certificate 
policies, based on the Global Status Report from REN21 (2011). The financial data are from 
the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD, 2017). We look at different institutional 
and market components of financial systems. For financial institutions, a key variable with 
wide data availability is private credit by deposit money banks divided by GDP. We also 
consider private debt and insurance company assets. 
The correlations between each potential determinant and solar and wind energy use are 
shown in the Appendix (Table A.2). The variables with the highest correlations with solar 
and wind energy are those in the policy, preference, and financial capital categories. The five 
highest positive correlations with wind energy include three financial variables and two 
policy variables. For solar PV, the five highest positive correlations include two variables on 
perceptions and preferences and three variables on policy. In the case of solar thermal, all 
three of the key categories of policies, preferences, and financial capital feature in the top 
five. Table A.2 also includes a number of other variables with lower correlations with solar 
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and wind energy use, such as fossil fuel reserves and trade openness. Our regressions focus 
on the variables with the higher correlations in Table A.2: those variables measuring policies, 
preferences, and financial capital.  
The potential importance of the explanatory variables for solar and wind energy use is 
evident in Figures 1–4. Both solar and wind energy are greater on average in 2015 for 
countries that were classified as high-income (Figure 1), that had a carbon price in 2010 
(Figure 2), had larger financial systems relative to their economy as proxied by private credit 
as a percentage of GDP (Figure 3), and that had higher percentages of citizens who were 
concerned about climate change (Figure 4). For wind energy, climate change perception 
appears to have less impact in Figure 4 than the variables in the other figures. For solar 
energy, private credit appears to have less impact in Figure 3 than the variables in the other 
figures. The figures do not imply causation given that the key explanatory variables are each 
correlated with other factors. Our regressions (section 4) will seek to identify conditional 
effects. 
 
Fig. 1. Energy use (solar and wind) per capita in tonnes of oil equivalent, split into two income 
groups: High-income and not-high income based on 2010 World Bank income groups. 138 countries 
are included with energy data for 2015, based on data availability. Sources: IEA (2017), World Bank 
(2017). Notes: toe is tonnes of oil equivalent. 
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Fig. 2. Energy use (solar and wind) per capita in tonnes of oil equivalent, split by carbon price status 
in 2010. 44 high-income countries are included with energy data for 2015, based on data availability. 
30 high-income countries had a carbon price in 2010. Sources: IEA (2017), Kossoy et al. (2015). 
Notes: toe is tonnes of oil equivalent. 
 
Fig. 3. Energy use (solar and wind) per capita in tonnes of oil equivalent, split into two groups based 
on size of private credit as a percentage of GDP. The two groups are private credit less than GDP and 
private credit greater than GDP. 138 countries are included with energy data for 2015, based on data 
availability. Sources: IEA (2017), GFDD (2017). Notes: toe is tonnes of oil equivalent. 
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Fig. 4. Energy use (solar and wind) per capita in tonnes of oil equivalent, split by climate change 
perceptions of citizens. The first group is countries where less than 50% of citizens viewed climate 
change as a serious personal threat, and the second group is greater than 50%. 138 countries are 
included with energy data for 2015, based on data availability. Sources: IEA (2017), Gallup (2009). 
Notes: toe is tonnes of oil equivalent. 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Solar energy results and discussion 
Table 2 shows solar energy results for the international sample of countries. There are 
positive and significant coefficients for the carbon price variable in each column of Table 2. 
For example, the coefficient in column 5 for the solar share of electricity is 0.024, significant 
at the one percent level. This implies that countries with a carbon price in 2010 had a solar 
share of electricity in 2015 that was on average 2.4 percentage points higher than countries 
without a carbon price in 2010, all else equal. Results are similar if only countries with a 
carbon price at a national level are assigned a value of 1, with countries with only sub-
national carbon prices (United States, Canada, and Japan in 2010) assigned a value of 0. It is 
possible that the carbon pricing coefficient might be driven by omitted variables rather than 
carbon pricing itself, but the carbon pricing variable remains significant when controlling for 
a binary feed-in tariff variable in the final three columns. A positive association between the 
binary carbon pricing variable and solar energy use is observable despite the low levels of 
current carbon prices relative to estimates of the social cost of carbon (United Nations, 2017). 
It is possible that even a low carbon price could encourage renewable energy use when there 
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is only a small cost gap between energy types, or when having a carbon price increases 
expectations of the future carbon price level. 
Table 2 also suggests that climate change perceptions make a considerable contribution to 
solar energy adoption. For a one percentage point increase in the proportion of citizens 
perceiving climate change to be a serious personal threat in 2007–2008, there are increases in 
2015 of 0.004 percentage points in the solar share of energy in the column 2 and 0.02 
percentage points in the solar share of electricity generation in column 5. These are small 
effects for solar energy use in absolute magnitude, but a one percentage point increase in 
citizen climate change perception is also small relative to the within-sample range of 15 to 85 
percent.  
The coefficients of many of the explanatory variables in Table 2 are not significant, with 
some notable exceptions. The log of global horizontal irradiance has positive and significant 
coefficients in four columns, suggesting that countries with more abundant solar resources 
have adopted more solar energy. This effect occurs primarily for solar photovoltaic energy 
rather than solar thermal energy (results available on request). There are also positive and 
significant coefficients for the global political participation variable in four columns. Greater 
solar energy use, in place of alternative fossil fuel sources, is one way that countries can meet 
global environmental obligations. 
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Table 2. Results for solar energy, 2015, global sample of countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Solar energy per 
capita 
Solar share  of 
energy 
Solar energy p.c. 
change 
Solar electricity 
pc 
Solar share of 
electricity 
Solar elect. 
p.c. change 
Perceived threat of climate change (lag) 
    
0.020*** 0.004** 0.008* 0.108** 0.017** 0.097** 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.047) (0.008) (0.042) 
Carbon price (lag) 0.011*** 0.005** 0.019** 0.127*** 0.024*** 0.101*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.039) (0.007) (0.035) 
Private credit divided by GDP (lag)  0.005** 0.006 0.003 0.004 -0.003 
   (0.002) (0.004) (0.036) (0.006) (0.028) 
Insurance assets divided by GDP (lag)  -0.006** -0.005 0.014 -0.002 0.023 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.070) (0.011) (0.059) 
Log GDP per capita (lag)  0.000 0.001 -0.009 0.002 -0.007 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.017) (0.003) (0.014) 
Log global horizontal irradiance   0.011*** 0.010 0.188*** 0.030*** 0.158*** 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.063) (0.011) (0.056) 
Log wind energy potential  -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) 
Log energy use per capita (lag)  -0.000 -0.001 0.021 0.002 0.018 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.018) (0.003) (0.016) 
Globalization: political partic. (lag)  0.008*** 0.005 0.125** 0.026** 0.103* 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.061) (0.012) (0.052) 
Government effectiveness (lag)  0.000 -0.005 0.008 -0.004 0.006 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.023) (0.004) (0.021) 
Feed-in tariff (lag)    0.015 0.002 0.013 
    (0.014) (0.002) (0.011) 
Observations 108 89 89 74 74 74 
R2 0.299 0.491 0.264 0.500 0.508 0.512 
Notes:  ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Energy change dependent variables are five-year changes to 2015. Private credit, 
insurance company assets, log GDP per capita, globalization: political participation, government effectiveness, and energy use are lagged by 5 years. Perceived threat of 
climate change is based on a survey from 2007–2008. Carbon price is a binary variable with value of 1 for countries that had a carbon price in 2010, and feed-in tariff is a 
binary variable with value of 1 for countries that had adopted feed-in tariffs prior to 2011. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients for 
constants are not shown. 
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Table 3 presents panel regressions using the between estimator with solar energy data for 
European Union countries for 2011–2015. The estimates suggest that aggregate policy 
support is positively associated with solar energy use, all else equal, with positive and 
significant coefficients in three of the columns. An additional euro per megawatt hour of 
aggregate policy support is associated with 0.004 additional percentage points of solar PV 
electricity share in column 1, and 0.002 percentage points of solar thermal energy share in 
column 5. For context, the average support in the estimation sample is approximately 200 
euro per megawatt hour. Our results showing the importance of aggregate policy support for 
solar energy are comparable to other studies that identify the importance of specific policies 
such as feed-in tariffs for renewable energy (Carley et al., 2016, for example). 
Preference for solar energy is positively associated with solar energy adoption for the EU 
sample of countries in Table 3. The solar preference variable has positive coefficients in each 
column, although the only significant estimates are at the ten percent level in both column 4 
and column 5 (the regressions for the solar thermal share of energy).  
The explanatory variables in Table 3 help to explain large fractions of the variation in solar 
energy use, with the R-squared in the final two columns exceeding 0.7, although most 
variables are not significant. This non-significance could be partly due to the small sample of 
EU countries. Log GDP per capita has positive and significant coefficients for the solar PV 
regressions but not for solar thermal. There are positive and significant coefficients for the 
private credit variable in the solar thermal regressions, but not for solar PV. These differences 
may relate to different financing structures for solar PV and solar thermal, with different 
mixes of small-scale and utility-scale installations. 
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Table 3. Results for solar energy (PV and thermal separately), 2011–2015, between estimator, European Union countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Solar PV share of 
electricity 
Solar PV share 
of electricity 
Solar PV 
electricity per 
capita 
Solar thermal 
share of 
energy  
Solar thermal 
share of energy 
Solar thermal 
energy per 
capita 
Preference for solar energy  
    
0.012 0.009 0.137 0.017* 0.016* 0.026 
(0.026) (0.031) (0.196) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) 
Aggregate solar policy support per MWh (lag) 0.035** -0.001 0.011 0.008 0.019*** 0.039*** 
(0.015) (0.021) (0.137) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) 
Private credit divided by GDP (lag)  -0.002 -0.024  0.009*** 0.015** 
  (0.010) (0.067)  (0.003) (0.006) 
Log GDP per capita (lag)  0.058** 0.284**  -0.008 -0.015 
   (0.021) (0.134)  (0.006) (0.013) 
Log global horizontal irradiance  0.042 0.203  -0.012 -0.016 
     (0.034) (0.216)  (0.010) (0.021) 
Log wind energy potential  0.003 0.025  -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.021)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Log energy use per capita (lag)  0.029 0.199  -0.003 -0.006 
  (0.020) (0.129)  (0.006) (0.012) 
Government effectiveness (lag)  -0.037** -0.195*  -0.000 0.001 
   (0.015) (0.094)  (0.004) (0.009) 
Globalization: political partic. (lag)  -0.033 -0.165  -0.001 0.007 
     (0.034) (0.215)  (0.010) (0.021) 
Observations 138 131 131 138 131 131 
R2 (between) 0.286 0.617 0.558 0.351 0.783 0.754 
Notes:  ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Policy support, government effectiveness, global political participation, energy use, 
GDP per capita, and private credit are lagged by 3 years. Preference for solar energy is based on a one-time survey from 2005, and solar and wind resources are long-term 
averages. Coefficients for constants are not shown. Standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Two outlier values for Poland are excluded (solar subsidies per 
megawatt hour in 2011 and 2012 are reported as over 30,000 euro, but none of the other EU countries had values above 1,600). Inclusion of these two outliers causes the 
positive and significant coefficients for solar policy support to become insignificant.
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4.2 Wind energy results and discussion 
Table 4 shows a positive contribution of policy for wind energy for the international sample 
of countries, with the carbon pricing variable being significant in two columns. There is 
significance in four of the columns when only national-level schemes are counted in the 
carbon pricing variable. The carbon price variable is still significant in column 5 when 
controlling for adoption of tradable renewable energy credits. The tradable renewable energy 
credits variable has a positive correlation with wind energy use per capita, but the correlation 
between the carbon price variable and wind energy use per capita is considerably higher in 
Table A.2. 
In Table 4, financial capital is a key contributor, with positive and significant coefficients for 
private credit in three columns. To assess another financial component, we include insurance 
company assets. The coefficients for insurance company asset size in Table 4 are also 
positive and significant in three columns. This suggests that multiple sources of financial 
capital are important, other than just bank assets, as insurance companies hold diversified 
asset portfolios including bonds and equity. 
Table 4 also has some other notable coefficients. Log GDP per capita has positive and 
significant coefficients in each column, and log of total energy use per capita has negative 
and significant coefficients. The positive coefficients for log GDP per capita are consistent 
with the finding of Burke (2010) that wind energy use has primarily been in higher-income 
countries. The coefficients for log wind energy potential are positive but not significant, but 
we find that countries with more solar resources tend to use less wind energy, with 
significance in two columns. This is consistent with the positive relationship between the log 
of global horizontal irradiance and solar energy in Table 2 given that solar and wind are 
substitutes. Climate change perception does not have a significant effect on wind energy use 
in any of the six columns of Table 4. Perhaps this is because the channel from climate change 
perception to greater renewable energy use is more indirect for wind energy when compared 
to solar energy; concerned citizens can directly install solar PV panels on individual rooftops, 
whereas the majority of wind energy is generated from large turbines. 
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Table 4. Results for wind energy, 2015, global sample of countries.  
Notes:  ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Energy change dependent variables are five-year changes to 2015. Private credit, 
insurance company assets, GDP per capita, globalization: political participation, government effectiveness, and energy use are lagged by 5 years. Perceived threat of climate 
change is based on a survey from 2007–2008. Carbon price and renewable energy credits are binary variables with value of 1 for countries that had these policies in 2010 and 
2011 respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients for constants are not shown. Excluding Denmark, which has large financial 
markets and wind energy consumption per capita, produces similar results.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Wind energy per 
capita 
Wind share of 
energy  
Wind energy 
p.c. change 
Wind electricity 
per capita 
Wind share of 
electricity 
Wind elect. per 
capita change 
Perceived threat of climate change (lag) 
    
0.008 0.002 -0.008 -0.155 -0.016 -0.096 
(0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.249) (0.052) (0.119) 
Carbon price (lag) 0.045*** 0.006 0.001 0.202 0.052** 0.014 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.131) (0.024) (0.081) 
Private credit divided by GDP (lag)  0.014** 0.005 0.324* 0.076* 0.038 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.188) (0.039) (0.078) 
Insurance assets divided by GDP (lag)  0.006 0.025* 0.505* 0.051 0.358** 
  (0.007) (0.013) (0.260) (0.042) (0.168) 
Log GDP per capita (lag)  0.006*** 0.005* 0.120* 0.045*** 0.071* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.070) (0.015) (0.038) 
Log global horizontal irradiance   -0.004 -0.031** -0.309 -0.034 -0.417** 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.228) (0.033) (0.168) 
Log wind energy potential  0.000 0.000 0.019 0.003 0.009 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.021) (0.003) (0.011) 
Log energy use per capita (lag)  -0.007*** -0.007** -0.158* -0.050** -0.096** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.089) (0.019) (0.046) 
Globalization: political partic. (lag)  -0.002 -0.003 -0.038 -0.066 -0.063 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.258) (0.068) (0.132) 
Government effectiveness (lag)  -0.002 0.003 0.027 -0.015 0.047 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.066) (0.014) (0.050) 
Renewable energy credits (lag)    -0.135* -0.016 -0.066 
    (0.080) (0.015) (0.057) 
Observations 108 89 89 74 74 74 
R2 0.394 0.507 0.593 0.618 0.465 0.592 
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The significant coefficients explaining wind energy and electricity in Table 4 are nearly all 
different to the significant coefficients explaining solar energy and electricity in Table 2. For 
wind, there are positive and significant coefficients for private credit, insurance assets, and 
log GDP per capita. There are negative and significant coefficients for the log of global 
horizontal irradiance and for total energy use per capita. The positive and significant 
coefficients for solar are for climate change perception, the log of global horizontal 
irradiance, and political participation in globalization. Positive and significant coefficients for 
the carbon pricing variable are seen in both the wind and solar regressions. 
Table 5 presents panel estimates using EU data for wind energy from 2011–2015. Table 5 
suggests that financial capital appears to have been important for adoption of wind energy. 
The coefficients for domestic private debt are positive and significant at the one percent level 
in four columns. This variable also has the highest correlation with wind energy use per 
capita in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Column 3 has a positive and significant coefficient for 
another financial variable, private credit, when omitting the domestic private debt variable to 
allow for a larger sample. The positive contribution of financial capital to wind energy 
suggests that this capital-intensive energy type has recently benefitted from larger supplies of 
private capital. Our results are consistent with intuition that (financial) markets play a larger 
role for relatively more mature technologies such as wind energy in 2015, while aggregate 
government support is more influential for technologies at an earlier stage of development, 
such as solar energy in 2015.  
Policies and perceptions are not key determinants of wind energy use for the EU sample of 
countries in Table 5. The lack of a significant effect of aggregate policy support on wind 
energy use may be because levels of support for wind have been quite low. Aggregate policy 
support per megawatt hour for wind energy was less than a quarter of the corresponding 
amount for solar energy from 2008–2012. 
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Table 5. Results for wind energy, 2011–2015, between estimator, European Union countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Wind energy 
per capita 
Wind share  of 
energy  
Wind share  of 
energy 
Wind 
electricity pc 
Wind share of 
electricity 
Wind share of 
electricity 
Preference for wind energy 
    
-0.032 -0.012 0.029 -0.376 -0.053 0.154 
(0.069) (0.023) (0.024) (0.806) (0.107) (0.153) 
Aggregate wind policy support per MWh (lag) -0.260 -0.092 -0.067 -3.023 -0.283 -0.307 
(0.189) (0.061) (0.057) (2.193) (0.290) (0.364) 
Private credit divided by GDP (lag) 0.024 0.012 0.016* 0.279 0.059 0.070 
  (0.022) (0.007) (0.008) (0.259) (0.034) (0.052) 
Log GDP per capita (lag) -0.031 -0.023 0.005 -0.356 -0.138 0.052 
    (0.056) (0.018) (0.017) (0.650) (0.086) (0.107) 
Log global horizontal irradiance  -0.018 0.001 -0.014 -0.211 -0.015 -0.123 
 (0.039) (0.013) (0.016) (0.451) (0.060) (0.103) 
Log wind energy potential 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.065) (0.009) (0.016) 
Log energy use per capita (lag) -0.012 -0.000 -0.019 -0.141 -0.022 -0.158 
 (0.052) (0.017) (0.015) (0.606) (0.080) (0.097) 
Government effectiveness (lag) 0.008 0.001 -0.002 0.089 0.007 0.001 
 (0.027) (0.009) (0.011) (0.313) (0.041) (0.071) 
Globalization: political partic. (lag) 0.118 0.046 0.056* 1.368 0.194 0.275 
 (0.094) (0.031) (0.026) (1.091) (0.145) (0.169) 
Domestic private debt divided by GDP (lag) 0.081*** 0.031***  0.945*** 0.191***  
(0.022) (0.007)  (0.260) (0.034)  
Observations 90 90 133 90 90 133 
R2 (between) 0.868 0.890 0.633 0.868 0.921 0.538 
Notes:  ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. All explanatory variables are lagged by three years, except for preference for wind 
energy, global horizontal irradiance, and wind resources. Preference for wind energy is based on a one-time survey from 2005. Solar and wind resources are long-term 
averages. Standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients for constants are not shown.
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5. Brief case studies 
We now present brief case studies of countries’ experiences in adopting solar and wind energy 
technologies. 
Denmark followed an ambitious and multi-dimensional policy approach to the adoption of 
renewables. Policies have included taxes on energy and pollution, investment subsidies and long-
term finance guarantees for wind energy capital costs, as well as encouragement of local 
cooperative ownership of wind turbines (Sovacool, 2013). Denmark was an early adopter of wind 
energy, with policy support commencing in 1976, and considerable growth in wind power capacity 
up to 2002 (Gavard, 2016). Denmark now has the highest wind energy use per capita in the world 
(see Table A.3). The results in the previous section suggest that carbon pricing in Denmark has 
likely contributed to greater wind energy use.  
Germany provides another example of multi-dimensional policy approaches, with early and 
ambitious renewable energy goals, including detailed regulatory provisions that differentiate 
between renewable technology types (Strunz et al., 2016), as well as considerable support for solar 
energy adoption. Solar energy policy support has fallen as the technology has improved, although 
solar subsidies per megawatt hour were still above the EU average in 2010. Germany had the 
highest level of solar PV energy use per capita in the world in 2015. 
There are a number of similarities in the renewable energy use, preferences, and policies for Baltic 
and Nordic countries.4 Solar energy adoption has been very low up to 2015, but wind energy 
adoption has been much higher. A higher proportion of citizens thought that their national 
governments should focus on wind energy compared to solar energy in 2005 in Baltic and Nordic 
countries, in contrast to the situation in every other EU country except Ireland (European 
Commission, 2006). Solar policy support per megawatt hour in Baltic and Nordic countries has also 
generally been lower than wind policy support, again in contrast to many other EU countries.  
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper finds evidence of differing determinants of solar and wind energy adoption. Carbon 
pricing appears to have been important for early adoption of solar energy. In addition, there is a 
positive association between aggregate policy support and solar energy use. We do not find 
evidence of a positive association between aggregate policy support and wind energy adoption for 
the period 2011–2015, but we do find evidence of a positive impact of carbon pricing. There is 
                                                   
4 Baltic countries include Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Nordic countries include Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, 
and Iceland. 
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evidence that perceiving climate change as a threat has been associated with greater solar but not 
wind energy use. It also appears that the size of domestic financial capital supplies has contributed 
to greater wind energy use but the effects on solar energy have been less clear. There appears to be 
a positive association between private credit and solar thermal energy use, but not solar PV energy 
use. Our results provide historical context regarding the early development of solar and wind 
energy. They are of ongoing policy relevance as more countries increase their adoption of solar and 
wind energy.  
Our results show that aggregate policy support could be important for technologies at an early stage 
of development, such as solar energy for the period 2011–2015. In the early years of solar energy 
adoption, considerable support per unit of energy production was required, as solar energy was still 
expensive. The lack of a positive association between aggregate policy support for wind energy and 
wind energy use for the period 2011–2015 suggests that policy support may not be as crucial a 
determinant for adoption of more mature energy types such as wind power. Wind power had 
received lower levels of support per megawatt hour from 2008–2012 and is already cost competitive 
in some cases. There could have been a positive effect of wind policy support for earlier periods 
when wind energy was less mature. For instance, Gavard (2016) finds that policy support, including 
feed-in tariffs, increased wind energy deployment in Denmark from 2000–2010. 
The positive relationship between carbon pricing and solar and wind energy adoption suggests that 
policy composition is important in addition to aggregate policy support. Governments could further 
consider the merits of carbon pricing, not only as a low-cost approach to reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions, but also given our new evidence of effects on renewables uptake, even with current low 
levels of carbon prices. Countries could consider commencing with a low carbon price, an approach 
that may face less political opposition than attempting to introduce a high carbon price. Early 
adoption of carbon pricing could help to avoid the lock-in of less efficient subsidy policies.  
The contribution of preferences and perceptions to explaining solar energy adoption rates implies 
that an emphasis on education might be important. Educators and policymakers could give greater 
attention to explaining the fundamental issues and principles related to climate change and 
renewable energy policy. In particular, they could encourage long-term, balanced, and holistic 
perspectives. In-depth knowledge of climate change may not be necessary for all individuals, but a 
general understanding could be useful. This greater focus on education could provide a more solid 
foundation, encouraging support for evidence-based policies, and reducing uncertainty over adverse 
future policy changes. Targeting potentially receptive audiences for climate change education, 
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rather than those strongly opposed, may be an effective strategy; Wendling et al. (2013) suggest that 
greater public support for immediate climate change action might involve motivating people with 
moderate climate change perceptions to increase their conviction. 
The positive association between solar preference and solar energy use motivates further research 
and consideration of policy options to leverage this relationship. It is possible that the relationship 
between solar preference and solar use could be stronger if constraints and barriers are lessened. 
This could lead to greater solar energy use. Policymakers could particularly consider targeting 
policy support in cases where solar preference is strong but where barriers prevent greater use. 
We also found that financial capital has been important for wind energy adoption. The aggregate 
size of financial institutions such as banks is an important contributor to wind energy use in both the 
EU and global samples. Financial market composition has also been important; outstanding 
domestic private debt, for example, appears to have supported wind energy use. Financial policies 
may have a role in complementing direct carbon and energy policies. Any policy that favors debt 
over equity could have indirect impacts on wind energy adoption, given that our results suggest that 
debt has been important for wind energy. The size and composition of private financial institutions 
and markets could also be increasingly important for the solar energy industry as solar energy 
continues to mature. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Description of variables that are in regressions or correlation table (A.2), grouped by 
type of variable. 
Variable Source Description 
Wind energy per capita IEA Wind, total primary energy supply, tonnes of 
oil equivalent per capita. 
Solar PV energy per capita IEA Solar photovoltaics, total primary energy 
supply, tonnes of oil equivalent per capita. 
Solar thermal energy per capita IEA Solar thermal, total primary energy supply, 
tonnes of oil equivalent per capita. 
Solar energy per capita IEA Solar (PV plus thermal), total primary energy 
supply, tonnes of oil equivalent per capita. 
Wind share of energy IEA Wind share of total primary energy supply 
(range 0 to 1). 
Solar PV share of energy IEA Solar PV share of total primary energy supply 
(range 0 to 1). 
Solar thermal energy share IEA Solar thermal share of total primary energy 
supply (range 0 to 1). 
Solar share of energy IEA Solar (PV plus thermal) share of total primary 
energy supply (range 0 to 1). 
Wind electricity per capita IEA Wind electricity output, megawatt hours per 
capita. 
Solar PV electricity per capita IEA Solar photovoltaic electricity output, 
megawatt hours per capita. 
Solar thermal electricity per capita IEA Solar thermal electricity output, megawatt 
hours per capita. 
Solar electricity per capita IEA Solar electricity output, megawatt hours per 
capita. 
Preference for wind energy EC Percentage of respondents who think that their 
national government should focus on 
development of wind power (QA65), divided 
by 100. Survey of 24,924 respondents from 
EU countries (roughly 1,000 per country) 
from 2005. 
Preference for solar energy EC Percentage of respondents who think that their 
national government should focus on 
development of solar power (QA65), divided 
by 100. Survey of 24,924 respondents from 
EU countries (roughly 1,000 per country) 
from 2005. 
Perceived threat of climate change 
(international sample) 
Gallup Percentage of respondents who think global 
warming is a serious personal threat, divided 
by 100. Survey of 206,193 respondents from 
128 countries in 2007 and 2008. 
Globalization: political participation KOF Political globalization index, values from 0 to 
100, divided by 100, based on: number of 
embassies, membership in international 
organizations, participation in U.N. Security 
Council Missions, international treaties. 
Renewable energy credits REN21 Tradable renewable energy credits at national 
or sub-national level, binary variable.  
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Feed-in-tariffs REN21 Feed-in tariff (including premium payment) at 
national or sub-national level, binary variable.  
Carbon price WB/Ec National or subnational carbon pricing 
instruments implemented, as of 2010, binary 
variable. 35 countries had carbon prices in 
2010. 
Wind RDD per capita IEA Total wind energy research, development, 
demonstration in million USD, 2014 prices 
and PPP, per capita (population from WDI). 
Solar RDD per capita IEA Total solar energy research, development, 
demonstration in million USD, 2014 prices 
and PPP, per capita (population from WDI). 
Aggregate wind policy support per 
megawatt hour 
Eco Total policy support for wind electricity 
(onshore plus offshore) including support for 
research and development, investment, and 
production in thousand Euro (2012) per 
megawatt hour. 
Aggregate solar policy support per 
megawatt hour 
Eco Total policy support for solar electricity 
including support for research and 
development, investment, and production in 
thousand Euro (2012) per megawatt hour. 
Government effectiveness WGI An index representing quality of public 
services and quality of policy formulation and 
implementation. The index values are 
normally distributed with mean zero and 
standard deviation of one. 
Weighted average cost of capital Diac. Weighted average cost of capital (%) for 
onshore wind projects in countries across the 
EU, based on interviews with experts (equity 
providers, project developers, bankers) in 
2014. 
Private credit (% of GDP) GFDD Private credit by deposit money banks, % of 
GDP, divided by 100. 
Domestic private debt (% of GDP) GFDD Outstanding domestic private debt securities, 
% of GDP, divided by 100. 
Public debt (% of GDP) GFDD Outstanding public debt securities (domestic 
and international), % of GDP, divided by 100. 
International priv. debt (% of GDP) GFDD Outstanding international private debt 
securities, % of GDP, divided by 100. 
Equity capitalization (% of GDP) GFDD Stock market capitalization, % of GDP, 
divided by 100. 
Foreign direct invest. (% of GDP) WDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows, % of 
GDP. 
Pension funds (% of GDP) GFDD Pension fund assets, % of GDP, divided by 
100. 
Insurance assets (% of GDP) GFDD Insurance company assets, % of GDP, divided 
by 100. 
Mutual funds (% of GDP) GFDD Mutual fund assets, % of GDP, divided by 
100. 
Log GDP per capita WDI Log gross domestic product per capita, 
purchasing power parity, constant 2011 
international dollars. 
Trade openness WDI Exports of goods and services plus imports, % 
of GDP. 
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Log patents per capita WDI Patent applications from residents and non-
residents, per capita, log.  
Log global horizontal irradiance B&G Log mean global horizontal irradiance (kWh 
per meter squared per year), area weighted, 0-
axis fixed tilted. 
Log wind energy potential LU Log wind energy potential (with capacity 
factors greater than 20% with siting limited as 
discussed in Lu et al. (2009)). 
Coal reserves per capita EIA Coal, recoverable reserves, 2014, million 
short tons per capita. 
Oil reserves per capita EIA Oil, recoverable reserves, 2014, billion barrels 
per capita. 
Gas reserves per capita EIA Natural gas, recoverable reserves, 2014, 
trillion cubic feet per capita. 
Log carbon dioxide emissions p.c. IEA Carbon dioxide emissions, electricity and heat 
production, thousand tonnes, per capita, log. 
Log energy use per capita WDI Energy use, kilograms of oil equivalent per 
capita, log. 
Sources: B&G: Breyer and Gerlach (2010), Diac: DiaCore (2016), EC: European Commission (2006), Eco: Ecofys 
(2014), EIA: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2017), GFDD: Global Financial Development Database (2017), 
IEA: International Energy Agency (2017), KOF: KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher 2006), LU: Lu et al. (2009), 
REN21: Renewable energy policy network for the 21st century (From Table 2 of Global Status Report 2011: Renewable 
energy support policies), WB/Ec: Figure 2 from joint report by World Bank and Ecofys (Kossoy et al. 2015), WDI: 
World Bank World Development Indicators (2017), WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015).  
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Table A.2: Correlations with wind, solar PV, and solar thermal energy per capita  
Variable Number of 
countries/ 
observations 
Correlation 
with wind 
energy per 
capita 
Correlation 
with solar 
PV energy 
per capita 
Correlation 
with solar 
thermal 
energy p.c. 
Wind energy per capita 138 1.00 0.35 0.25 
Solar PV energy per capita 138 0.35 1.00 0.39 
Solar thermal energy per capita 138 0.25 0.39 1.00 
Preference for wind energy 28 0.49 -0.31 -0.20 
Preference for solar energy 28 -0.18 0.44 0.51 
Perceived threat of climate change 108 0.26 0.44 0.25 
Globalization: political participation 136 0.42 0.39 0.24 
Renewable energy credits 93 0.37 0.29 -0.03 
Feed-in-tariffs 93 0.14 0.25 0.21 
Carbon price 139 0.59 0.59 0.29 
Wind RDD 25 0.40 -0.22 -0.11 
Solar RDD 25 0.02 -0.09 0.05 
Wind policy support per MWh 28 -0.10 0.21 0.32 
Solar policy support per MWh 28 0.01 0.49 0.33 
Government effectiveness 137 0.53 0.47 0.32 
Weighted average cost of capital 28 -0.29 -0.28 0.18 
Private credit (% of GDP) 128 0.55 0.42 0.50 
Domestic private debt (% of GDP) 49 0.72 0.15 0.16 
Public debt (% of GDP) 48 0.05 0.38 0.06 
International priv. debt (% of GDP) 74 0.39 0.21 0.09 
Equity capitalization (% of GDP) 99 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
Foreign direct invest. (% of GDP) 135 -0.04 0.20 0.21 
Pension funds (% of GDP) 69 0.19 0.03 0.04 
Insurance assets (% of GDP) 117 0.62 0.43 0.13 
Mutual funds (% of GDP) 59 0.21 -0.08 -0.05 
Log GDP per capita 137 0.38 0.40 0.25 
Trade openness 136 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 
Log patents per capita 91 0.30 0.31 0.07 
Log global horizontal irradiance 130 -0.49 -0.21 0.09 
Log wind energy potential 137 0.21 0.08 0.01 
Log carbon dioxide emissions p.c. 135 0.23 0.31 0.20 
Coal reserves per capita 133 0.06 0.17 0.07 
Oil reserves per capita 129 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 
Gas reserves per capita 127 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 
Log energy use per capita 139 0.32 0.34 0.17 
Notes: Dependent variables (wind energy per capita, solar PV energy per capita, and solar thermal energy per capita) 
are for 2015. Independent variables are at a 5-year lag, consistent with the cross-sectional results, unless data are 
unavailable: please see Table A.1 for details.  
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Table A.3: Key data: Global country sample 
102 countries in the global sample with data available for energy, climate change preference, and 
private credit are listed in the following table (the first column of Table 2 and 4 include more 
countries because private credit is not a control in these columns). Carbon pricing status in 2010 is 
also shown. Energy variables are for 2015, perceived threat of climate change is from 2007/2008, 
and private credit is for 2010.  
Country Wind 
energy 
per capita 
Solar PV 
energy 
per capita 
Solar 
thermal 
energy per 
capita 
Perceived 
threat of 
climate 
change 
Carbon 
price 
Private 
credit (% 
of 
GDP/100) 
Algeria 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.46 0 0.14 
Angola 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.38 0 0.18 
Argentina 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.71 0 0.10 
Armenia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.65 0 0.25 
Australia 0.041 0.022 0.015 0.75 0 1.22 
Austria 0.048 0.009 0.021 0.54 1 0.97 
Azerbaijan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.43 0 0.17 
Bangladesh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.32 0 0.36 
Belarus 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.3 0 0.36 
Belgium 0.042 0.023 0.002 0.68 1 0.56 
Benin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.15 0 0.22 
Bolivia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.51 0 0.32 
Botswana 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.3 0 0.24 
Brazil 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.76 0 0.48 
Cambodia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.51 0 0.25 
Cameroon 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.32 0 0.11 
Chile 0.010 0.006 0.002 0.69 0 0.63 
China 0.012 0.003 0.016 0.21 0 1.28 
Colombia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.65 0 0.30 
Congo, Rep. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.31 0 0.05 
Costa Rica 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.72 0 0.45 
Czech Republic 0.005 0.018 0.002 0.39 1 0.46 
Denmark 0.214 0.009 0.006 0.4 1 1.95 
Dominican Rep. 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.46 0 0.20 
Ecuador 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.69 0 0.22 
Egypt 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.21 0 0.32 
El Salvador 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.51 0 0.94 
Estonia 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.32 1 0.95 
Finland 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.39 1 0.86 
France 0.027 0.009 0.001 0.75 1 0.94 
Georgia 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.47 0 0.29 
Germany 0.084 0.041 0.008 0.6 1 0.91 
Ghana 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.19 0 0.14 
Greece 0.037 0.031 0.018 0.82 1 1.02 
Guatemala 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.51 0 0.23 
Haiti 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.35 0 0.13 
Honduras 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.57 0 0.47 
Hong Kong, SAR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.54 0 1.64 
Hungary 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.75 1 0.60 
Iceland 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.33 1 1.70 
India 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.29 0 0.44 
Indonesia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.33 0 0.22 
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Iran 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.43 0 0.53 
Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.28 0 0.04 
Ireland 0.122 0.000 0.003 0.6 1 1.54 
Israel 0.000 0.011 0.043 0.62 0 0.85 
Italy 0.021 0.032 0.003 0.76 1 0.90 
Japan 0.003 0.024 0.003 0.8 1 1.05 
Jordan 0.001 0.000 0.021 0.51 0 0.68 
Kazakhstan 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.35 0 0.41 
Kenya 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.49 0 0.31 
Korea, Rep. 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.8 0 0.92 
Kyrgyz Rep. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.39 0 0.12 
Latvia 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.37 1 0.95 
Lebanon 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.54 0 0.70 
Lithuania 0.024 0.002 0.000 0.47 1 0.58 
Luxembourg 0.015 0.016 0.003 0.75 1 0.97 
Malaysia 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.5 0 1.02 
Malta 0.000 0.019 0.010 0.64 1 1.17 
Mexico 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.63 0 0.18 
Moldova 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.73 0 0.32 
Mongolia 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.3 0 0.37 
Morocco 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.29 0 0.70 
Mozambique 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.48 0 0.22 
Namibia 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.35 0 0.47 
Nepal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.32 0 0.51 
Netherlands 0.038 0.006 0.002 0.57 1 1.16 
Nicaragua 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.49 0 0.24 
Niger 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.21 0 0.11 
Nigeria 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.18 0 0.17 
Pakistan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.24 0 0.21 
Panama 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.61 0 0.73 
Paraguay 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.54 0 0.30 
Peru 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.58 0 0.24 
Philippines 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.42 0 0.28 
Poland 0.025 0.000 0.001 0.54 1 0.48 
Portugal 0.096 0.007 0.008 0.85 1 1.56 
Qatar 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.43 0 0.42 
Romania 0.031 0.009 0.000 0.66 1 0.39 
Russian Fed. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.39 0 0.40 
Saudi Arabia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.4 0 0.38 
Senegal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.33 0 0.24 
Singapore 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.59 0 0.91 
South Africa 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.21 0 0.72 
Spain 0.091 0.015 0.053 0.69 1 1.70 
Sri Lanka 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.65 0 0.24 
Sudan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.42 0 0.10 
Sweden 0.143 0.001 0.001 0.56 1 1.20 
Syria 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.41 0 0.20 
Tajikistan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.19 0 0.11 
Tanzania 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.48 0 0.15 
Thailand 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.61 0 0.92 
Togo 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.23 0 0.19 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.71 0 0.34 
Tunisia 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.46 0 0.60 
Turkey 0.013 0.000 0.011 0.66 0 0.38 
Ukraine 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.52 0 0.63 
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United Kingdom 0.053 0.010 0.001 0.69 1 1.90 
United States 0.052 0.009 0.009 0.63 1 0.52 
Uruguay 0.052 0.001 0.000 0.68 0 0.21 
Vietnam 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.53 0 1.00 
Zambia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.18 0 0.10 
  
 
